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[Summarized below are highlights of a brief description, and assessment of major criticisms
launched against Sen. Bill Bradley's debt relief plan by Prof. Rudiger Dornbusch (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology). Prof. Dornbusch's remarks were recorded during testimony before
Congress on March 3 this year. (From "Third World Debt," Hearings before the Subcommittee
on International Development Institutions and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session on H.R. 3, A bill to
enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes, March 3 and 4, 1987. US
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 1987 (Serial No. 100-7, for sale by the Superintendent
of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402)]
Sen. Bradley's plan focuses attention on the costs to the US of the Third World foreign debt, not only
as a banking problem, but also as a trade issue and a serious foreign policy problem. The trade issue
can be summarized as follows: US manufactures exports to Latin America in 1986 totaled about $16.9
billion, down from $21.9 billion in 1980. Meanwhile, manufactures imports from Latin America in
1986 came to approximately $16.7 billion, compared to $7 billion in 1980. The US manufactures trade
surplus with Latin America fell from $14.9 billion in 1980 to $0.2 billion in 1986. Bradley has criticized
the Baker Plan for adding to Third World nations' debt.
Only less debt, he says, can inspire growth and investment, and debt relief is the only means to
achieve reduced debt. He recommends a program of selective, limited and targeted debt relief to
be granted in exchange for trade concessions. Countries selected would receive three percentage
points of interest relief for one year on all debt, 3% write-down of principal, and $3 billion of new
multilateral lending available for participating countries. In exchange participating countries would
be required to implement growth-oriented adjustment programs with specific import liberalization
content.
Two broad types of criticism of the Bradley plan have dominated: it would be destructive to bank
profitability and even stability; countries choosing to participate in such a relief program would find
access to the world capital market impaired for many years. According to Dornbusch, the impact
of the Bradley plan on bank profitability and stability has been exaggerated in three major ways. 1)
The plan would be applied selectively, i.e., it would not service all problem debtors at once. Thus,
calculations of debt relief cannot be made on the basis of all problem debts. 2) Regulatory and
possibly tax relief permitting banks to spread the costs of relief over a period of years is envisaged
in the plan. The banks' participation in the debt relief plan is voluntary; they would participate
only if they consider it beneficial. Criticisms which focus on some sort of government pressure to
obligate the banks into giving away concessions are simply unwarranted. 3) At present, banks are
accumulating paper profits: they lend money to a debtor to who uses it to pay interest. If some day
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the loan goes into default, it will be clear dividends were distributed that should have been used as
loan loss reserves.
There is a pervasive belief that ultimately the loans must be written down, and the secondary
market attests to this. Nevertheless, on the commercial banks' books, paper interest is recorded as
profit. "Writing down these paper profits merely recognizes a fact, it does not in any substantive
way take money away from stockholders."
Dornbusch concludes by saying: "The plan certainly does not mean the destruction of the banking
system but rather a temporary reduction in net earnings. Since reported earnings represent in fact to
some extent only paper earnings the estimate of the true cost is even further reduced...[U]nless the
banks expect to profit they will not participate. But, course, banks will be slow to accept because they
sense the potential for a much bigger participation of the taxpayer. No doubt, it will take a major
crisis say Brazil 14 months in arrears before banks will choose to cooperate."

-- End --
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